Why Have Nuclear Weapons Not Been Used in Conflict Since 1945?

Why make thermo atomic weapons not been employ in encroach since 1945? atomic weapons have l nonpareil(prenominal) ever been spendd once in human history, and that was during knowledge base fightfargon II when The join renders deployed missiles on Japanese territory, in Nagasaki and Hiroshima. At the beat of bombing in 1945 plainly the USA had developed atomic weapons, whilst directly the pool of enounces consisting of atomic weapons is still extremely sm whole, with however nine res publicas place claim to atomic technology and weaponry. This atomic proliferation is rationaliseed by Darryl Howlett who let offs this as the oecumenical spread of nuclear weapons.For Howlett alleges atomic number 18 nuclear driven beca hire of the strategic, political and prestige benefits attached to nuclear weapons1. In the modern world the mass media are often critical about nuclear weapons and the flagellums they pose for society, moreover this begs the brain wherefo re have nuclear weapons not been utilise in conflict since 1945? To answer this question the issues of tabu and deterrence and the comer of virtual nuclear arsenals must be called into question, as well as theoretical vagarys such as rationality from proliferation optimists and proliferation pessimists.I lead to a fault see at whether we presently live in a non-proliferation regime, and look at the alternatives for stay and nuclear non-usage. The first area of nuclear non-usage I ordain look at will be the descents brought onwards by proliferation pessimists and optimists. Kennitz Waltz, a proliferation optimist grapples on one hand we cannot stop the spread of nuclear weapons. Its required because states seek power through nuclear weapons even smaller, less decently states align themselves with nuclear wielding states for protection and security.But on the other hand, Waltz argues states are rational actors, and believes nuclear weapons will be used responsibly, which is why nuclear weapons have not been used. For Waltz, more than states who have nuclear weapons, the better. Waltz writes, A blatant offensive is madness. Nuclear weapons and states that acquire them will reduce the chances of war and lower the intensity of war. 2 For Waltz this provides deterrence from the threat of nuclear weapons. If this is the case, it would explain why nuclear weapons were used in the first place thither simply was no deterrence against the United States in Japan.Arguing against the optimists, Proliferation pessimists have some other answer for the non-usage of nuclear weapons. Scott D. Sagen, proliferation pessimist has contradictory views of the state, believing states could be irrational, especially when militaristic figures take over decision make. Sagen argues all military have organisational behavior3 where by military figures are more likely to resort to nuclear warfare, and for a few who dare to venture, there is always an issue with miscalculation .Sagen argues the only conclude nuclear weapons havent been used is because there hasnt been a war worth using them in. For Sagen disarmament is a core of ending the possibility of a nuclear threat. Furthermore, my next point explores the idea and theory surrounding the concept of taboo as a reason why nuclear weapons havent been used since 1945. Taboo is a concept coined by Nina Tanenwald, and it incriminates the tradition of non-use, in this case nuclear weapons have fit stigmatised4.For Tanenwald deterrence alone doesnt explain why nuclear weapons havent been used Deterrence works though in Tanenwalds view, but only when working side by side with taboo. With nuclear weapons there are moral, honourable and political be attached, with Tanenwald stating that a moral norm proscribing the use of nuclear weapons developed during the decades by and by the Hiroshima and Nagasaki attacks5 when talking about the moral issues of nuclear weapons. World opinion is also the biggest poli tical constraint, with many people feeling politically and honestly fall in against the usage of nuclear attacks.In addition the norms and values of a society wielding nuclear weapons also matters, with South Africa an example of nuclear disarmament because of social and ethical efforts made by their people. Possibly the biggest example of taboo was during the nineteen course of study Vietnam War. Nina Tanenwald argues that nuclear were not used, which is obviously true, but using nuclear gunman was heavily discussed by United States forces. Three American presidents, Lyndon B. Johnson, John F. Kennedy and Richard Nixon, all in power during the Vietnam War chose not to use nuclear force.Tanenwald believes it is the moral, ethical and political factors, the taboo effect which proves non-use of nuclear weapons. Furthermore the concept of taboo and deterrence working together comes from theoriser Henry Kissinger who was the Secretary of State under the Richard Nixon administration during the Vietnam War and played a huge interlace in United States foreign policy. In his book Diplomacy, Kissinger writes, never have the military gap betwixt the superpower and non-nuclear state been greater. never was it best likely to be invoked. 6 Tanenwald would suggest Taboo was working in the concept of Deterrence with Kissingers words, possibly signalling the importance of taboo as a reason for nuclear non-use since 1945. The third argument for the absence of nuclear weapons since 1945 is through the concept of deterrence. Deterrence is the measures taken by a state or an alliance of multiple states to prevent hostile action by another, in this case through nuclear weapons. Colin Gray is one theoretician who believes because of deterrence nuclear weapons are not used because they are not rational.According to Gray, taboo holds no truth, so argues against the ideas of Nina Tanenwald fiercely, with Gray going on to record that its in any case clever7 to retaliate from a nuclear missile, so states are deterred from doing so in the first place. Gray and deterrence supporters are worried that if people begin believing in the truth of taboo, states mogul feel obliged to disarm nuclear artillery, which could prove even more fatal as it will disrupt the ratio of power, especially between larger nations.With less nuclear capable states, there is a alarm amongst deterrence supporters one state could use nuclear weapons to enhance their place as an international actor, and cause more war in doing so8. In this case, weapons are used as the ultimate form of deterrence, one which maintains the balance of power and eliminates the threat of nuclear strikes. The next area of discussion is the arrival of virtual nuclear arsenals (VNAs). According to Michael Mazaar virtual nuclear arsenals are where you butt in and reconstruct nuclear weapons9.When looking at why these have helped unfold the nuclear non-use, virtual nuclear arsenals are important because the y eliminate the threat of miscalculation or an accidental bombing. Secondly by having deconstructed weapons, you can instal each individual part separately, which means your weapons are harder to steal as they are stored in un copen locations. Mazaar argues that nuclear weapons havent been used because VNAs act as a deterrent from attack. No one will strike your territory with a nuclear missile it they know at some point down the line there will be a retaliation from a VNA10.This means the advantages of having nuclear missiles is modify because state and military actors are deterred from using nuclear weapons. Ashley J. Tellis backs up this argument brought forward by Mazaar, stating that because of VNAs, India and Pakistan, two guessries with a war-torn history have been deterred from employing nuclear ending upon one another and mankind11, because each state uses VNAs, showing that virtual nuclear arsenals have successfully helped stop the use of nuclear weapons since 1945.The debate of virtual nuclear arsenals is continued and furthered by theorist John Schell, who looks at how unarmed deterrence limits nuclear action. For Schell no nuclear strikes have occurred because by constructing a nuclear weapon deterrence would persist, and VNAs could be built to counter nuclear missiles. Schell famously quotes Missile deters missile, poor boy deters bomber, submarine deters submarine Factory deters factory, blueprint deters blueprint, equation deters equation. 12 In this sense, weaponless deterrence acts as a good strategic form of vindication from nuclear attacks, and further explains why nuclear weapons havent been used in conflict since Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Many would now argue that we live in times of a nuclear non-proliferation regime, which is the limitation of nuclear activity, brought forward by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). As many states struggle nuclear weapons, even states with these weapons are often opposed, the NPT, a treaty with 189 state members acts as a treaty to stop the spread and possible use of nuclear weapons.The treaty was adopted in 1970 and is considered a three lynchpin system, focusing on non-proliferation, disarmament and the right to peacefully use nuclear technology, and every fiver years the treaty is reviewed. Its worth noting that five nuclear states (The USA, Russia, France, The United Kingdom and China), who collectively make up the constant members UN security council are all signed up to this treaty. The argument could be made that because of the current NPT regime nuclear eapons pose little and contain threat, and instead of owning nuclear technology for possible war and destruction, rather the ferocity of war has been slowed down to focus on technological improvements with nuclear technology, which could explain why nuclear weapons have not been used since 1945. In proof nuclear weapons do pose a serious threat to humanity, but as Ive outlined because of taboo, and deterr ence there are too much political and ethical issues attached. virtual(prenominal) nuclear arsenals now mean nuclear weapons have a secure hiding place, and the possibility of an unthought VNA strike is deterring people from using weapons.Others such as Waltz argue that humans and states as are rational and nuclear weapons will be used responsibly, which is the case with the nuclear non-proliferation treaty, but others such as Sagen argue that we cant trust states with nuclear decision making and our future is going to be compromised by the elite few who will one mean solar day exterminate the human race. But with each day that passes, do nuclear weapons still scare people? Maybe the only war nuclear weapons will become prominent once more and the real issue and effects of nuclear weapons will only become important if one is used.The alternatives for peace are already here. No, we cannot eliminate nuclear weapons, but with VNAs the concept of deterrence and taboo, as well as peopl e becoming more rational and aware of the disaster nuclear weapons potentially bring, the safest option, is to hold on to what we have, which is the reminder in Nagasaki and Hiroshima of the damage and destruction that is caused and keep these weapons as a learning tool for the future. Word count 2079 BIBLIOGRAPHY Gray, C. S. , (2005) Another Bloody Century future day Warfare (London Weidenfeld & Nicolson)Howlett, Darryl Nuclear Proliferation in John Baylis and Steve Smith, The Globalisation of World Politics (Oxford OUP, 2001, second edition) Kissinger, H. (1994) Diplomacy (New York Simon & Schuster) Mazarr, Michael J. , (1995) realistic nuclear arsenals, Survival 373, pp. 7-26 Sagan, S. D. , (1994) The perils of proliferation organisation, theory, deterrence theory and the spread of nuclear weapons, external security system 18(4) 66-107 (E-Journal). Schell, J. , (1984) The Abolition (London Pan Books) Tannenwald, N. (1999) The Nuclear Taboo The United States and the Normative B asis of Nuclear Non-use International Organization 53(3) 433-48 Tellis, A. J (2001) Indias emerge Nuclear Posture (Santa Monica RAND) Waltz, K. N. (1981) The Spread of Nuclear Weapons More May wagerer Adelphi Papers, 171. Available at http//www. mtholyoke. edu/acad/intrel/waltz1. htm 1 Howlett, Darryl Nuclear Proliferation in John Baylis and Steve Smith, The Globalisation of World Politics (Oxford OUP, 2001, second edition) 2 Waltz, K. N. (1981) The Spread of Nuclear Weapons More May damp Adelphi Papers, 171.Available at http//www. mtholyoke. edu/acad/intrel/waltz1. htm 3 Sagan, S. D. , (1994) The perils of proliferation organisation, theory, deterrence theory and the spread of nuclear weapons, International Security 18(4) 66-107 (E-Journal). 4 Tannenwald, N. , (1999) The Nuclear Taboo The United States and the Normative Basis of Nuclear Non-use International Organization 53(3) 433-48 5 Tannenwald, N. , (1999) The Nuclear Taboo The United States and the Normative Basis of Nuclea r Non-use International Organization 6 Kissinger, H. 1994) Diplomacy (New York Simon & Schuster) 7 Gray, C. S. , (2005) Another Bloody Century Future Warfare (London Weidenfeld & Nicolson) 8 Gray, C. S. , (2005) Another Bloody Century Future Warfare (London Weidenfeld & Nicolson) 9 Mazarr, Michael J. , (1995) Virtual nuclear arsenals, Survival 373, pp. 7-26 10 Mazarr, Michael J. , (1995) Virtual nuclear arsenals, Survival 373, pp. 29-92 11 Tellis, A. J (2001) Indias Emerging Nuclear Posture (Santa Monica RAND) 12 Schell, J. , (1984) The Abolition (London Pan Books)